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North Korea’s Nuclear-Armed Missiles 
Options for the US and its Allies in the Asia-Pacific 
Michael Paul /Elisabeth Suh 
During his presidential campaign, Donald Trump unsettled the governments of Japan 
and South Korea by suggesting they should develop their own nuclear weapons to 
defend against the missile threat from North Korea. When Pyongyang announced the 
launch of four missiles towards the island of Guam, a US territory in the West Pacific, 
President Trump demanded North Korea stop issuing threats against the US or “they 
will be met with fire and fury”. Instead of bellicose rhetoric, however, diplomacy is 
needed to bring about de-escalation and dialogue with North Korean leader Kim Jong-
un. Pyongyang has made significant advancements in its nuclear and missile weapons 
programmes. Washington is now faced with the quandary of how to react to the grow-
ing threat both to its allies and to its own territory. None of the policy options avail-
able to the US and its allies in the Asia-Pacific region seem promising and can, at best, 
only be successful in the long term. 
 
Kim Jong-un has adopted a dual strategy 
that combines the pursuit of nuclear weap-
ons with economic progress. The regime’s 
self-confidence has grown in recent years, 
mainly due to North Korea’s advancements 
towards nuclear-armed status which it 
regards as essential to national prestige and 
its legitimacy. In addition, the city of Pyong-
yang is experiencing a modest, but evident 
economic boom. 
The regime’s primary goal is to preserve 
and protect the Kim dynasty. For Pyong-
yang, the fates of Saddam Hussein and 
Muammar Gaddafi serve as proof that the 
only guarantee for his own and his regime’s 
survival is its nuclear weapons programme. 
Furthermore, nuclear weapons could be 
seen in Pyongyang to serve as a leveraging 
tool to possibly even demand the with-
drawal of US troops and achieve unification 
with South Korea according to the Kim re-
gime’s terms. In this sense, nuclear-capable 
long-range missiles could result in driving a 
wedge between the allies and ultimately 
decouple the US from its alliance obliga-
tions in the Asia-Pacific region. 
Due to its alliance policy and its status as 
a Pacific power, the US, alongside China, is 
the most important actor in East Asia. Also, 
from a historical perspective, the US signed 
the ceasefire agreement with China and 
North Korea in 1953 in order to end the 
fighting in Korea. The key to finally ending 
the Korean War and solving the North 
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Korean crisis lies, therefore, in Washington. 
Nevertheless, the US government has only 
limited options at its disposal to prevent 
North Korea from further advancing its 
nuclear-capable missiles, or to even force 
their complete disarmament. All of these 
options are neither good nor very promis-
ing and all of them require consistent sup-
port, particularly from Beijing and Seoul. 
The Current Status of Weapons 
Developments in North Korea 
Until recently, the regime in Pyongyang 
was regarded as a paper tiger and its ability 
to build nuclear-armed intercontinental 
missiles was thought to be very unlikely or 
could happen only in a distant future. How-
ever, the regime has made significant prog-
ress with regard to nuclear weapons and 
carrier systems in recent years. 
North Korea conducted its first nuclear 
weapons test on 8 October 2006, and its 
second on 25 May 2009. Since Kim Jong-un 
came to power in November 2011, there 
have been three more tests. The most recent 
and biggest test took place on 9 September 
2016 – with an explosive force of ten kilo-
tons (the atomic bombs used on Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki in 1945 were between ten and 
20 Kt). It was allegedly the test of a minia-
turized nuclear warhead that can be 
mounted onto a missile. The regime is said 
to already possess more than a dozen 
nuclear explosive devices and have further 
weapons grade material at its disposal. In a 
worst-case scenario, Pyongyang might have 
more than 100 nuclear weapons by 2020. 
According to such an assessment, the for-
mer paper tiger has become a real threat – 
which also comes from its growing experi-
ence in missile technology. 
In 2016, North Korea conducted 24 mis-
sile tests, the highest number ever recorded 
in one year. These tests reveal the diversity 
of Pyongyang’s launch sites spread across 
the country and the variety of missile and 
carrier systems, including intermediate-
range missiles with a range of between 
3,000 and 5,000 kilometres (Intermediate-
Range Ballistic Missile, IRBM). The Kim re-
gime has also tested the simultaneous 
launch of several ballistic missiles, missile 
launches with steep trajectories and mis-
sile launches from a platform at sea (Sea-
Launched Ballistic Missile, SLBM). These 
variations could make it more difficult for 
the THAAD defence system, which is de-
ployed in South Korea, to intercept North 
Korean missiles. In the long term, the devel-
opment of indigenous SLBMs is the most 
dangerous and technically most difficult 
undertaking. China might become con-
cerned about these developments since the 
leadership in Beijing attaches great impor-
tance to its own second-strike nuclear cap-
ability, which is largely achieved with 
SLBMs. North Korea is now attempting to 
station its Pukguksong-1 missiles on sub-
marines. The regime is even said to be de-
veloping new submarines for this purpose. 
Furthermore, Pyongyang is working on 
missiles with a range of more than 5,500 
kilometres (Intercontinental Ballistic Mis-
sile, ICBM) that can be launched from fixed 
or mobile sites on land. The launch of a 
North Korean satellite in 2012 probably 
served to develop a nuclear-armed ICBM be-
cause space launch vehicles have character-
istics similar to those required to lift pay-
load onto intercontinental missiles. Further 
tests followed to evaluate various compo-
nents, such as solid and liquid fuel, mobile 
launch units and flight engines. 
Missile tests conducted in May 2017 con-
firm that further progress was rapidly be-
ing made. On 14 May, North Korea tested a 
medium-range missile (Hwasong-12) with a 
range of more than 4,000 kilometres, as US 
experts calculated. A few days later, North 
Korean media announced that the govern-
ment had tested a missile propulsion stage, 
which observers believed to be the element 
of a new ICBM. Another medium-range mis-
sile with a range of 1,000 to 3,000 kilo-
metres (Medium-Range Ballistic Missile, 
MRBM) was launched on 21 May from a 
mobile transporter. This solid-fuelled mis-
sile (Pukguksong-2) is said to have gone into 
serial production. 
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Solid-fuel rockets can be deployed on 
mobile units, allowing for quick operability 
and greater survivability. The benefit of 
solid-fuel engines is that the fuel is extreme-
ly stable, thus the missile can be easily 
stored and the weapon is ready to be fired 
virtually immediately. As a mobile system 
the missile is more difficult to detect and 
neutralize before it is launched. Further 
tests are likely to show whether or not they 
are also reliable. 
Even though Pyongyang’s prototype mis-
siles often appear to be deficient, it would 
be irresponsible to ignore these develop-
ments. South Korea and Japan are already 
within range of North Korea’s short and 
medium-range missiles. In theory, these 
missiles can already be equipped with 
weapons of mass destruction – nuclear, 
biological or chemical. 
Strategic Patience à la Trump 
After reviewing its options, in April 2017, 
the Trump Administration announced it 
would adopt a policy of “maximum pres-
sure and engagement” in order to force 
North Korea to end its weapons pro-
grammes. The new US government does 
not yet have a comprehensive China or 
East Asia strategy, however, and there are 
still open questions regarding its policies 
towards Pyongyang. As with previous ad-
ministrations, Washington’s ultimate goal 
is the complete, verifiable and irreversible 
denuclearization of North Korea. Moreover, 
the Trump government insists that China 
fully and consistently implement the sanc-
tions imposed on Pyongyang. Otherwise, 
the US is prepared to move forward only 
with its allies, South Korea and Japan. 
To a great extent, Washington’s current 
policy resembles the approach of strategic 
patience, which was previously adopted by 
the Obama administration. Both approach-
es are based on the assumption that North 
Korea will return to the negotiating table 
and commit to denuclearization if enough 
political and economic pressure is applied. 
This approach as well as the assumption 
that the regime will soon collapse both ap-
pear to be unlikely. On the contrary, Pyong-
yang has become even more self-confident 
as a result of its technological advances. 
The ICBM launch on 4 July, which accord-
ing to Trump should not have taken place, 
illustrates that the administration is un-
sure how to deal with the situation. 
“It won’t happen!” – And Now? 
In his 2017 New Year’s speech, Kim an-
nounced that preparations for the test 
launch of an intercontinental missile were 
in their final stages. Trump responded the 
following day with a tweet that “it won’t 
happen!”. Yet, Pyongyang flight-tested an 
ICBM for the first time on 4 July, making it 
a surprise “gift” for the US on Indepen-
dence Day, according to propaganda from 
North Korea. The Hwasong-14 missile flew 
for 37 minutes in a lofted trajectory and 
then landed in the Japanese Sea, 930 kilo-
metres from the launch site. 
According to estimates by the Pentagon, 
this missile has an intercontinental range 
of 6,700 kilometres. Russia, on the other 
hand, designated it as a medium-range mis-
sile. On 28 July, Pyongyang tested yet an-
other missile (according to Seoul: “a more 
advanced ICBM class”) which clearly had an 
intercontinental range of up to 10,000 kilo-
metres. These types of missiles allow North 
Korea to threaten cities in the US. 
The progress in developing missiles is 
significant. It remains doubtful, however, 
whether the missiles and their components 
would work under realistic conditions. 
Also, it is not clear whether North Korean 
engineers have mastered the mechanically 
and thermally demanding technology for 
re-entry vehicles. After all, besides trans-
porting the warhead, delivering the weapon 
reliably to the target is the most important 
purpose of a missile and there are a num-
ber of possible sources of error here. Still, 
technologically simple explosive devices 
can be directed at a target area and projec-
tion data can be improved with further 
testing. 
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North Korea has demonstrated that it 
has an ICBM capability. It is, therefore, only 
a matter of time before the country is able 
to arm it with nuclear weapons. As an il-
legitimate but de facto nuclear-armed state, 
North Korea’s behaviour threatens to further 
undermine the non-proliferation treaty 
(NPT) and to promote the proliferation of 
nuclear weapons and missile technology. 
Since Kim firmly believes that nuclear-
capable missiles are the only guarantee of 
survival for him and his regime, Pyong-
yang’s technological developments will be 
continued and, without appropriate incen-
tives or pressure not to do so, even intensi-
fied. Is there, however, potentially a red 
line that should not be crossed? If Kim con-
tinues to launch long-range missiles, pos-
sibly aimed at Guam, Seoul and Washing-
ton might respond by attempting to inter-
cept them. A sixth, perhaps even atmo-
spheric, nuclear weapons test, which would 
serve to improve warhead designs and 
increase explosive yields, would present an 
even greater provocation. Testing a hydro-
gen bomb, as the regime supposedly did in 
January 2016, would be similarly provoca-
tive. However, the current administration 
has refrained from officially defining a red 
line. The US government is under increas-
ing pressure since, to date, it has only been 
reactive and not proactive – contrary to 
what Trump himself had promised. 
Bad and Less Bad Options 
In general terms, there are four categories 
of options available to the US and its allies 
in order to initiate negotiations and pre-
vent North Korea from further advancing 
its nuclear capabilities. These options can 
be sequenced and applied in combination. 
Yet, none of these options appear only by 
themselves as promising, each would be 
effective only to a limited extent and all 
would cost a lot. 
1. Military intervention 
US Secretary of Defense, James Mattis, spoke 
of a “clear and present danger” with regard 
to North Korea, but avoided threatening 
pre-emptive strikes. The US has ample 
capacities in the Pacific to credibly increase 
the pressure on Pyongyang and, if neces-
sary, to intervene militarily. The U.S. Pacific 
Command has sufficient military capabili-
ties at its disposal and Washington can also 
send additional carrier strike groups and 
attack submarines. During his visit to South 
Korea in April 2017, Vice President Mike 
Pence recalled the US military attacks with-
in Syria and Afghanistan, warning not to 
underestimate President Trump’s determi-
nation as well as the strength of US forces. 
Nevertheless, weapons deployment remains 
the most dangerous and least promising 
option. 
Potential targets in North Korea, such as 
command and control facilities, missile 
launch bases and nuclear weapons’ sites are 
widely spread across the country. Many 
facilities and depots are buried deep under-
ground; and a number of locations are even 
unknown due to the lack of intelligence (US 
satellites can only monitor one third of the 
country). It would thus be virtually impossi-
ble to destroy all these sites simultaneously 
with air strikes or special forces. 
Any military intervention would, there-
fore, entail a great degree of uncertainty 
and risks. Even if limited strikes by the US 
focus on missile bases only, the conflict 
could quickly escalate and lead to hundreds 
of thousands of casualties. Around half of 
South Korea’s population and many US sol-
diers and their families live in the metro-
politan area of Seoul, which is within range 
of North Korean artillery. Furthermore, 
North Korean missiles can reach Tokyo and 
US bases in Japan. And finally, even an ex-
tensive military intervention would only 
delay, but not completely stop, Pyongyang’s 
development of nuclear-capable, long-range 
missiles. 
This outcome would be different in the 
case of a preventive war that includes a 
large-scale invasion of the country. But this 
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would require a massive contingency of US 
and allied forces. Such a new Korea war 
would be expected to last for weeks or even 
months and would have unforeseeable con-
sequences. A war scenario employing only 
conventional weapons would likely claim at 
least one million lives (this number would 
dramatically increase should nuclear weap-
ons be used). 
2. Strengthening deterrence and defence 
This option suggests that the US and its 
allies in the Asian Pacific region strengthen 
their capabilities to deter and defend 
against North Korea. This allows for increas-
ing military pressure on North Korea, while 
avoiding the direct use of force. The US is 
already carrying out manoeuvres with 
South Korea’s armed forces and has de-
ployed additional fighters and bombers in 
the region. Additionally, the Trump admin-
istration is continuing cyber operations 
(the effectiveness of which remains unclear) 
to manipulate Pyongyang’s missile launches 
which were intensified in 2014 under 
Obama. Also South Korea is planning to 
develop long-range ballistic missiles with 
explosive devices designed to hit under-
ground targets. Some South Korean parlia-
mentarians from the conservative opposi-
tion party are even calling for US tactical 
nuclear weapons to be re-deployed in the 
country. 
The preferred choice of action is to 
strengthen missile defence systems within 
the trilateral alliance of the US, South 
Korea and Japan. This approach would also 
foster national US missile defences and is 
likely to be taken into account in the Penta-
gon’s ongoing Ballistic Missile Defense 
Review (BMDR). North Korea’s missile test 
on 28 July 2017 led Seoul to accelerate the 
deployment of THAAD. Japan is working to 
improve its BMD technology (Aegis and 
Standard Missile, SM) in order to provide its 
navy with new interceptor missiles in co-
operation with the US company Raytheon 
(SM-3 Block IIa). Tokyo may also want to 
deploy land-based systems (Aegis Ashore). 
The current US BMD systems have so far not 
been particularly successful against long-
range ballistic missiles. Should US or Japa-
nese Aegis BMD ships be used against a 
North Korean missile, this might reveal 
current deficits within the missile defence 
systems – or even trigger unintended reac-
tions by actually fuelling an escalation in-
stead of preventing it. 
3. Implementing sanctions 
The United Nations Security Council has by 
now established a complex sanctions regime 
against North Korea. However, it seems to 
be failing due to the lack of collective im-
plementation as well as to Pyongyang’s 
actions to circumvent these sanctions. As 
an example, North Korea was able to obtain 
foreign currency over a long period of time 
by running a hostel and convention centre 
in its embassy’s compound in Berlin. 
The consistent implementation of sanc-
tions by China is crucial. However, its trade 
with North Korea did not decrease in the 
first quarter of 2017, but instead rose by 
40 percent. Trump has consequently rated 
the statements made by Chinese President 
Xi Jinping in April 2017 at their joint meet-
ing in Florida as unsatisfactory. However, 
ahead of the important National Congress 
of the Chinese Communist Party to be held 
in autumn 2017, Beijing will likely be un-
willing to implement far-reaching sanctions 
against Pyongyang that might seriously 
jeopardize the Kim regime and, as a result, 
cause regional instability. 
The US could, as it did in the case of Iran, 
increase pressure itself and impose uni-
lateral secondary sanctions against Chinese 
banks and companies. Since 2009, inter-
national banks are said to have conducted 
business worth of 700 million dollars with 
companies connected to North Korea. 
Deutsche Bank and some major US banks 
have been targeted by the US Justice Depart-
ment for conducting business with North 
Korean companies. In early July, the US 
Treasury Department imposed its own puni-
tive measures against, among others, the 
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Bank of Dandong as well as a Chinese ship-
ping company because both had traded with 
North Korea. By the end of August 2017, the 
US had imposed additional secondary sanc-
tions on a number of Chinese and Russian 
firms trading with North Korean counter-
parts. 
On 5 August, the UN Security Council 
unanimously imposed a new set of multi-
lateral sanctions. These are intended to 
decimate an income worth one billion US 
dollars, which would be equivalent to one 
third of the value of North Korea’s total 
exports. However, there is little hope that 
sanctions alone can change the behaviour 
of the North Korean regime. 
4. Take a chance on diplomacy 
Diplomacy with Pyongyang poses a norma-
tive dilemma: North Korea has undermined 
the international nuclear non-proliferation 
regime by controversially withdrawing 
from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 
2003 while further developing its nuclear 
weapons programme. If the US administra-
tion would start negotiations with Pyong-
yang, that would be a de facto recognition 
of North Korea as a nuclear-armed state and 
honour its breach of international norms, 
which in turn could send the wrong signal 
to other rogue states. 
As a result of this dilemma, no US ad-
ministration has yet pursued a negotiating 
goal less ambitious than the complete, veri-
fiable and irreversible denuclearization. 
The concern is that if North Korea’s de facto 
nuclear weapons status were to be recog-
nized, Japan or South Korea might consider 
producing nuclear weapons by themselves, 
which would further promote nuclear 
proliferation. As the Trump administration 
is also following this line, Washington does 
not consider a mere arms control regime 
with Pyongyang worthwhile. 
Yet, pragmatic arms control measures, 
instead of disarmament, could result in a 
freeze of North Korea’s nuclear weapons 
and missile advancements at the current 
level. This ‘frozen’ status, however, needs to 
be verifiable. However, Pyongyang had last 
expelled inspectors from the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 2002; to 
date, the regime continues to refuse inter-
national inspections or other verification 
measures. Even if a ‘freeze’ were enforce-
able, the risk of proliferating missile and 
nuclear weapons technology would remain. 
In any scenario of negotiations, Pyong-
yang would certainly demand more and dif-
ferent concessions than it has in the past. 
Humanitarian aid and economic support 
were sufficient to convince North Korea to 
agree to a missile moratorium in 2012. Due 
to the regime’s increased self-confidence, 
however, Pyongyang now considers direct, 
bilateral negotiations with Washington and 
an end of US-South Korean joint military ex-
ercises as equitable counter-offers. Although 
Washington and Seoul have rejected a halt 
of their bilateral manoeuvres, they might 
be willing to change the parameters of 
those exercises. 
Pyongyang is no longer seeking bilateral 
security guarantees, since those were last 
given to North Korea by the US in the joint 
statement of the six-party talks in 2005. In-
stead, a potential, alternative option would 
be to formally end the Korean War. A peace 
treaty would replace the ceasefire agree-
ment signed in 1953 by representatives of 
the US, China and North Korea. However, 
political resistance in Washington and 
Seoul would pose considerable obstacles to 
such efforts. The South Korean constitution 
would also need to be amended so that it 
recognizes the existence of two Korean 
states, which were simultaneously recog-
nized by the United Nations in 1991. That 
North Korea’s propaganda machine would 
likely portray the peace treaty as a victory 
over US imperialism would be the least of 
the downsides. Most importantly, a peace 
treaty would deprive Pyongyang of any 
reason to continue its nuclear weapons 
programme. At the same time, however, the 
alliance between Washington and Seoul as 
well as the deployment of US troops to 
South Korea would lose their legitimate 
justification. 
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Would the US be ready for such far-reach-
ing concessions, which could weaken its 
dominant role in the Asia-Pacific region? So 
far, there is no indication that Washington 
wants to scale down its commitments in 
the Asia-Pacific region. In the South China 
Sea, for example, it continues to conduct 
Freedom of Navigation operations which 
are contesting China’s claim to territorial 
waters surrounding its newly created 
outposts. Concerning the Taiwan issue, 
Washington is also not showing any wil-
lingness to make concessions, let alone 
agree to a transactional ‘deal’. As a con-
sequence, there is little reason to expect 
any fundamental changes within the Sino-
US relationship, nor any bilateral progress 
on the Korean issue. 
Pathways to Dialogue 
Like the Obama administration, the Trump 
administration will need some strategic 
patience against North Korea since military 
actions seem highly risky and successful 
negotiations will be tedious. Building up or 
rather continuing international pressure 
on Pyongyang is thus a first step to take. 
Here, China’s attitude and cooperation is 
paramount. The question remains, how-
ever, whether Beijing – in the absence of 
major concessions from the US – will prefer 
to maintain the fragile status quo in which 
North Korea acts as a geopolitical buffer 
against the US presence in East Asia. The 
Chinese leadership will certainly not want 
to exert any great pressure and, ultimately, 
experience a re-unified Korea with US troops 
at the Yalu river. The North Korean regime 
knows about these fundamental geopoliti-
cal dissonances and understands how to 
skilfully push the limits of its weapons 
development. 
Meanwhile, the focus is shifting towards 
the newly elected South Korean government. 
The US and China both support Seoul’s 
leadership role with regard to North Korea. 
President Moon Jae-in made it clear in his 
Berlin speech on 6 July that he wants to 
build upon the ‘Sunshine Policy’ of his 
predecessors Kim Dae-jung (1998–2003) and 
Roh Moo-hyun (2003–2008). The main focus 
of this approach to inter-Korean reconcilia-
tion is on humanitarian and economic 
issues. Moon expands this approach by 
aiming for a peace treaty with a nuclear 
weapon-free North Korea by 2020. He has 
announced a negotiating plan and other 
initiatives for achieving this goal. Further-
more, he has also promised to change 
South Korean law in order to incorporate 
the documents of previous and future inter-
Korean summits, making them survive the 
change of presidential office-holders in Seoul 
every five years. The most recent high-level 
inter-Korean talks took place in August 2015 
after a border incident and family reunions 
occurred in October 2015. After a fourth 
nuclear test in 2016, all military communi-
cation channels between Pyongyang and 
Seoul were cut off; the Kaesong industrial 
complex, one of the most important coop-
eration projects between North and South 
Korea, was shut down. Although President 
Moon wants to reopen Kaesong, the South 
Korean parliament is still debating whether 
this would be a responsible step – for years, 
there had been suspicions that the salaries 
of North Korean workers at Kaesong were, 
in fact, channelled to the North Korean 
Communist Party. 
Like the US administration, Moon also 
believes in a dual-track policy towards 
Pyongyang, combining the offer of talks 
with increased pressure. With Trump’s ad-
ministration focusing merely on imple-
menting and expanding sanctions, it seems 
to focus on the “maximum pressure” part 
of the dual-track policy. Moon’s govern-
ment, on the other hand, seems to try the 
engagement-part of the policy. 
However, South Korean initiatives, such 
as the offer of inter-Korean military dialogue 
in mid-July, have not received any positive 
replies from their Northern counterparts. 
In fact, North Korea’s official newspaper, 
Rodong Sinmun, mocked the South’s offer 
and portrayed it as hypocritical. In doing 
so, Pyongyang is not only ignoring the real 
balance of power, but is also underestimat-
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ing the escalating effect of its repeated and 
decades-old threats against Seoul and 
Washington – if the Kim regime really 
were to implement them, this would mean 
its own end. 
Finally, it is also conceivable that the 
Trump administration will not officially 
accept the status quo, but come to terms 
with it over the course of time. In this case, 
the allies would increase their resources for 
regional deterrence and defence. In con-
trast to the Cold War, North Korea can 
expect asymmetric nuclear retaliation and 
annihilation if it ever launched a nuclear-
equipped missile against the US. At the 
same time, this covert recognition of Pyong-
yang’s nuclear-armed status would contra-
dict the US’s official commitments to South 
Korea and Japan, while fitting with Trump’s 
‘America first’ mantra. In theory, a commit-
ment to extended nuclear deterrence be-
comes more credible, the less the need for 
its implementation – meaning, the fewer 
strategic resources North Korea has or the 
better equipped South Korea’s armed forces 
are. Washington cannot ignore Pyongyang’s 
already achieved and continuously improv-
ing capabilities; otherwise its security guar-
antees to Seoul and Tokyo lose credibility. 
In the absence of persuasive alternatives 
on the part of the US, rapprochement be-
tween North and South Korea may act as a 
‘door-opener’ to the nuclear issue between 
Washington and Pyongyang. North Korea, 
however, does not regard South Korea as an 
equal actor with regard to security politics. 
From the North Korean perspective, the US 
is the only partner with which it will dis-
cuss nuclear issues. Pyongyang denounces 
Seoul as a puppet regime of the US and con-
siders itself the only independent Korean 
government entitled to bilateral talks with 
Washington. Therefore, a whole series of 
diplomatic steps is needed to ensure that, 
firstly, provocations cease, that inter-Korean 
rapprochement becomes viable and that, 
ultimately, dialogue with the US can take 
place. Close coordination between allies, on 
the one hand, and cooperation with China, 
on the other, will be crucial. 
In any case, only a confidence-building 
policy of small steps over the next years can 
remove barriers and thereby promote rap-
prochement and, finally, peace. Moon seems 
to be on the right track to enabling the 
Trump administration to begin a dialogue 
“under the right circumstances”. In doing 
so, it will be vital for him to keep the US on 
his side and also overcome any domestic 
controversies over exchanges with North 
Korea. South Korea’s Sunshine Policy is still 
often criticized as a spending hole for Seoul 
and a source of funding for Pyongyang’s 
arms. Also, the alliance between the US, 
South Korea and Japan is likely to be put 
under renewed stress. 
Presumably, new formats are needed for 
possible negotiations between the US, 
North Korea and South Korea in order to 
involve China, to reassure Japan and to 
prevent Russia from carrying out disruptive 
action. Ideally, Beijing should not only be 
involved in sanctions, but also in any new 
security guarantees. 
Germany will support a policy of recon-
ciliation and non-proliferation. Although 
Pyongyang has none of its nuclear missiles 
aimed at Europe, it is in Berlin’s interests 
that peace in Northeast Asia is maintained, 
that the NPT is bolstered and that the trans-
fer of nuclear and missile technology is pre-
vented. 
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